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ABSTRACT
The finding of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) thatcountries'
investment rates are highly correlated with their nationalsaving rates has
by now been confirmed by many subsequent studies, eventhough their
inference that international capital mobility must be lowhas not been as
widely accepted. This paper examines the statisticalrelationship between nationalsaving and investment in a sample that includes not Only 1 L industrializedcountries, but also 50 developingcountries. The paper
addressessome of the econometric critiques that have been aimedat the
Feldstein—Horiokawork. Contrary to what one would expect from considerationof capital mobility, the coefficientappears higher for
industrialized countries than for developingcountries, and higher after
1973 than before.
Our interpretation of the saving—investment evidenceis that the
hypothesis of a high degree of substitutability for claimson physical
capital located in different countries is not supportedby the data.
International substitutability for financial capitalmay be high, but this
is a separate condition (which is properly testedby looking directly at
rates of return). High international substitutability forbonds would
inply high international substitutability for physicalcapital if capital
were perfectly substitutable for bonds within eachcountry, but there is no
reason for this to hold, any more than there is for allgoods to be perfect
substitutes.
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Washington, DC 20431 Washington, DC 20431Many subsequent studies have by now confirmed the finding of Feldstein
and Horioka (1980) that countries' investment rates are highly correlated
with their national saving rates. Nonetheless their inference that inter-
national capital mobility must be low has not been as widely accepted.
This paper examines the statistical relationship between national saving
and investment in a sample that includes not only 14 industrialized
countries, but also 50 developing countries. Contrary to what one would
expect from considerations of capital mobility, the coefficient appears
higher for industrialized countries than for developing countries, and
higher after 1973 than before. We find that these results survive
econometric techniques designed to deal with some of the critiques that
have been aimed at the Feldstein—Horjoka work.
Our interpretation of the saving—investment evidence is that the
hypothesis of a high degree of substitutability for claims on physical
capital located in different countries is not supported. There is no
contradiction between this conclusion and the hypothesis that some finan-
cial assets are perfect substitutes in the portfolios of international
investors. This is a separate condition (which is properly tested by
looking directly at rates of return). It could hold, and yet real
interest parity fail, if goods are not perfect substitutes. 1/
The puzzle of higher saving—investment correlations for industrialized
countries than for developing countries could then be explained by higher
1/ This point is fully developed in Frankel (1985).—2--
real exchange rate variability among the former. Alternatively, if direct
international substitution between claims on physical capital--imperfect
as it is——is considered more relevant than the roundabout route through
financial capital and goods, then one could explain greater effects on
investment in industrialized countries than in developing countries, even
for the same degree of independent variability in rates of return, by
assuming that investment in physical capital is more responsive tothe
domestic market rate of return in industrialized countries than in
developing countries.
I. Econometric Critiques of Savings—Investment Correlations
Most of the econometric criticisms of Feldstein and Horioka can
be subsumed in the general complaint that the righthand—side variable
is correlated with the error term, that is, that national saving is
endogenous. Though this problem is an ever—present dangerin macroeco-
nomics, it is particularly likely when the lefthandside and righthand—
side variables, together with the current account, are linked by an
identity.
Three conditions must hold before one could expect no relationship
between investment and saving rates. Each is strong.
Condition 1: a country's investment rate depends only on a "repre-
sentative" national real rate of return r but not upon other variables
that are correlated with domestic savings. For convenience we assume
the relation to be linear:—3—
(1) I/Y =a—hr+ €.
Thestatistical support for the relationshipbetween investment and the
real interest rate has in fact
always been disappointingly weak. We know
that, at a minimum, there must be alarge error term c.But if investment
is to be uncorrelated withsaving, it is crucial that this error term be
purely random, that it be uncorrelated notonly with the national rate of
return, but also with national saving.
Condition 2: the domestic expected realrate of return relevant for
investment and savings decisionsmust equal the foreign expected rate of
return: r =r*.If we think of the capital accountas a function of
the differential in returns,
(2) KA =k(r—r*)
then the hypothesis is that k is infinite.This is the only one of the
three conditions that couldproperly be associated with the phrase "inter-
national capital mobility" astraditionally understood. (The other two
Conditions are econometric ones.)But, we will argue, financial capital
mobility may not be sufficient to produceeven this condition, if the
condition is interpreted as the internationalequalization of expected
real yields on physical capital.
Condition 3: the foreign expectedrate of return relevant for
saving and investment is determinedexogenously. In other words, the
domestic country is not largeenough in world financial markets to affect
the world interest rate.— 4-..
The statistic in question is Cov(I/Y, NS/Y), where NS/Y is the ratio
of national saving (private plus public) to income. 1/ Using equation (1),
we can decompose this covariance into three parts:
(2) Cov(I/Y, NS/Y) =Cov(c,NS/Y) —hCov(r_r*, NS/Y) —hCov(r*, NS/Y)
Condition 1 says the first term is zero, condition 2 the second term, and
condition 3 the last term. If any of the three fails to hold, if any one
of the links is broken, then there is no reason to expect the investment
rate to be uncorrelated with the saving rate.
Each of the three conditions in fact often fails to hold. In order
to gauge the empirical importance of these failures, this paper examines
the statistical relationship between national saving and investment in
a sample that includes not only 14 industrialized countries,but also
50 developing countries. 2/ The paper addresses some of the econometric
critiques that have been aimed at the Feldstein—Horioka work. Contrary
to what one would expect if physical capital was mobile across countries,
the coefficient relating investment and national saving appears to be higher
for industrialized countries than for developing countries, and higher
after 1973 than before. Moreover, among developing countries there is a
clear difference in the behavior of domestic saving and investment rates
between countries that obtained external resources primarily through
international capital markets and those that receive substantial official
transfers. The saving and investment correlations for developing
1/ The regression coefficient is of course the covariance divided by
the variance of NS/Y, and the correlation coefficient is the covariance
divided by the standard deviation of each.
2/ Summers (1985a) and Fieleke (1982) also include developing
countries in their samples.—5—
countries that rely on international capital marketsare difficult to
distinguish from industrial countries.
The remainder of this paper is divided intothree sections.
Section I first considers the econometricproblems associated with
examining the relationship between domestic saving andinvestment
ratios. Section II considers empirical results forsaving and invest-
ment relationships for differentgroups of developed and developing
countries. Section III provides a rationale for theobserved integration
of markets for some financial instruments andthe apparent isolation of
national markets for real saving and investment.
[I. Endogeneity of National Savings andInvestment
One obvious version of the endogeneityproblem that arises in time
series studies is the strongly procyclicalnature of both saving and
investment, even when expressed as shares of GNP. Ifan exogenous boom
causes both to rise, we do not want to attribute thecorrelation to low
capital mobility. For this reason, Feldstein and Horiokarestricted
their analysis to cross—section data,as did most who followed in their
footsteps. 1/ But even in time series studies,one can cyclically adjust
the saving and investment data. 2/
An alternative version of the problem that isrelevant even for
cross—section studies is the fact that thesaving and investment rates
both depend on the rate of growth of nationalincome, as determined for
example by population growth or productivitygrowth. This problem is
1/ Other cross—section studies include Fieleke(1982), Feldstein (1983),
Penati and Dooley (1984), Murphy (1984),Caprio and Howard (1985), and
Summers (l985a).
2/ Sachs (1981) included a GNPgap variable in his regressions. Frankel
(1985) tried two approaches: decadeaverages on a 10 year time sample of
U.S. data, and cyclically—adjusted annualsaving and investment rates on
shorter postwar time samples. A third time—seriesstudy is Obstfeld (1985).—6—
particularly relevant if the sample includesboth industrialized countries
and developing countries. One solution that hasbeen applied is to add
the rate of growth as a second explanatory variable.But the finding has
been that holding the growth rate constant, like holdingthe business
cycle constant, does not reduce the coefficientin the saving—investment
regressions. 1/
The most popular version of the endogeneity critiqueis that govern-
ments react systematically to current accountimbalances so as to offset
them. For example, if the government reacts to atrade deficit induced
by an increase in investment by cutting governmentexpenditure or rais-
ing taxes, then national saving and investmentwill be correlated for
reasons having nothing to do with capital mobility.2/
It is important to realize how general the endogeneity argumentis.
Any economic variable, in addition tothe cost of capital that influences
the investment rate, will probably be correlatedwith the national saving
rate. This is true not just of the levelof income, population growth,
and productivity growth, but also energy shocks,real wages, strikes, and
so forth. 3/ If factors, other thanthe cost of capital, that determine
1/ Fry (1984) and Summers (l985a) both argue, inthe context of
developing countries in particular, that theinfluence of the growth
rate on the other two variables explainsthe saving—investment correla-
tion. Obstfeld (1985) makes the argument carefully,in the context of
OECD countries. But Summers (l985a, p. 22) addedthe rates of population
growth and GNP growth to his regressionsand found no effect on the
saving coefficient.
2/ The "policy reaction" argument has been made byFieleke (1982),
Tobin (1983), Westphal (1983), Caprio and Howard(1984) and Summers
(l985a, b). Summers calls it the "maintainedexternal balance"
hypothesis.
3/ Many of these factors would probably biasthe correlation upward.
But some would go the opposite way, in the directionof a negative corre-
lation. If a country discovers oil, investmentshould go up but saving
should go down. Similarly, an investment tax creditshould raise invest-
ment but lower the budget surplus andtherefore national saving.—7—
investment happen to be uncorrelated withnational saving, then there
will be no econometric problem. (This istrue even if government policy
reacts systematically to current accountimbalances.) But such a lack
of correlation, with or without t,erfectcapital mobility, is an absurdly
strong condition. Since the difference between nationalsavings and
investment is identically equal to thecurrent account it would imply
that the factor in question has theidentical effect on the current
account as on investment.
If national saving depended ononly the national rate of return and
other factors thought to be random (uncorrelatednot only with the rate
of return but also with investment),we could invert the equation and
regress national saving against investment. Thehypothesis that foreign
capital is in infinitely elastic supply ata given rate of return would
imply a zero coefficient. This test would beequivalent (given the
national saving identity) toregressing the current account against
investment. The null hypothesis would in thatcase be a unit coeffi-
cient, implying that any exogenous changes in investmentare fully
financed by borrowing from abroad. This infact is the equation run by
Sachs (1981, 1983). But the idea that therate of return is the only
systematic determinant of both private and publicsaving has received
even less support than the analogousassumption for investment. Clearly
the right answer is that nationalsaving, investment and the current
account are all endogenous, and that somecovariance among these
variables is to be expected.
The question remains, however, as towhy there is so little independent
variation among these variables. Surelysome of the factors that influence—8—
domestic savings do not have an equal and positiveeffect on investment.
Yet it is shown in the next section that a positivecovariance "near" to
one is evident for very different country groupsand over very different
time periods. Moreover, the country group withthe lowest correlation is
also the group that relies the least on market—determinedcapital flows.
It follows that factors which generate high correlationsbetween national
savings and investment in the presence of capitalmobility must be
remarkably similar both across country groupsand over long time periods.
It seems important therefore to confront the "endogeneity"problem
directly through an instrumental variables approach.Indeed, the original
Feldstein and Horioka paper used instrumental variables.1/ Two candi-
dates for instruments for national savings are militaryexpenditure and
the dependency ratio (the population less than15 years or 65 years or
over in age, divided by the working age populationin between). The
former is most immediately a determinant of the governmentbudget deficit
(government dissavings) and the latter of privatesaving. It is possible
to think of ways that either could be endogenous;it is conceivable that
military expenditure could be cut back in responseto trade deficits 2/
and that the age composition of the populationcould respond to the
growth rate. But these two variables seem tomeet the criteria for
1/ Their four instrumental variables were theratio of retirees over the
age of 65 to the population aged20—65, the ratio of younger dependents to
the working age population, the labor force participationrate of older
men, and the benefit/earning "replacementratio" under social security.
2/ Total government expenditure may not be a good enoughinstrument,
as Summers (1985a) found, because underthe policy-reactiOfl argument it
is endogenous.—9-.
instruments better than most instrumentalvariables in macroeconocs.
Regressions based on them are reported in thenext Section.
III. Results for the RelationshipBetween Investment
and National Saving
In this section, we examine therelationship between national saving,
defined to include both private andpublic sector saving, and investment
for a sample composed of 14 industrialcountries and 50 developing coun-
tries. 1/ Our first objective is toconsider whether the empirical
results obtained for industrialcountries (e.g., Feldsteln and Horioka
(1980) and Penati. and Dooley (1984)) alsoextend to the developing coun-
tries, and whether the developing countriescan be treated as a homogenoug
group or differ according to the nature of theresource transfer they
receive from foreign sources.
Table 1 summarizes some of theempirical results based on ordinary
least squares regressions that havebeen obtained in past studies for
the savings and investmentrelationships for the industrial countries.
Three preliminary conclusionsare evident in these results. First,
industrial countries that hadrelatively high rates of gross fixed
investment also had relatively highgross domestic savings rates.
Second, examined over time, industrialcountries that accumulated capital
1/ The countries included in thesample are listed in the data
appendix.— 10—
Table1.Industrial Countries: Saving, Investment,
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Table1 (concluded). Industrial Countries:Saving, Investment,
and Current Account Balances !/
Number of
Indus trial
Countries Sample Period Regression Equation R2
15. 19 (1971—81) (I/Y) =0.030+ 0.88(s/y)
(0.88) (6.12)*
0.71
16. 19 (1971—81) (CA/Y) =0.033—0.19(I/y)
(1.17) (—1.66)
0.11
17. 19 (1974—81) (I/Y) =0.034+ 0.88(s/y)
(0.91) (5.47)*
0.68
18.19 (1974—81) (CA/y) =0.04—0.24(I/y)
(0.76) (—0.93)
0.12
19.19 (1949—59)—(1971—81) t(i/Y) =0.021+0.78(s/y)
(4.87)* (6.11)*
0.70
20. 19 (1949—59)—(1971—81)(cA/y) =—0.015+ 0.05MI/y)
(—3.15)* (0.46)
0.01.
21. 19 (1949—59)—(1974—81)(I/Y) =0.024+0.77E(s/y)
(5.67)* (5.81)*
0.70
22. 19 (1949—59)—(1974—81)(CA/Y) =0.019—0.02(I/Y) 0.01
1/ Parentheses enclosing a period ofyears Indicates the average value
of the variables during that period. The delta ()indicatesthe change
from the average of the first period indicated inparentheses to the
average of the second. Dots indicate that the statistic of theparameter
is not reported by the authors. I denotesgross domestic fixed invest-
ment, Y gross national or domestic product, CA the currentaccount balance
including official transfers, S gross national saving, and OIL thenet
imports of oil at constant prices. The t—statistics are shown inparen-
theses below the coefficients, and an asterisk (*) indicatesthat the
coefficient is significant at the 5 percent level.
The sources for regressions 1—4 and 6—8 are as follows:
1, Feldstein and Horioka (1980), p. 321; 2, Feldstein(1983), p. 135;
3 and 4, Sachs (1983), p. 105; 6, Feldstein and Horioka(1980), p. 327;
7, Sachs (1981), p. 250; and 8, Feldstein (1983),p. 144. The remaining
regressions are from Penati and Dooley (1984).— 12—
morerapidly in the most recent periods also experiencedincreases in
saving as a share of GNP. However, conflictingevidence was developed
with regard to the relationship between investmentratios and current
account ratios. For example, Sachs (1981,1983) found a negative and
significant slope coefficient in cross sectionregressions for either
the levels or changes in. current account balancesand investment ratios.
Such a relationship would be consistent with a high degreeof capital
mobility. In contrast, Feldstein and Horioka(1980) and Penati and
Dooley (1984) did not find a significant negativecoefficient; as a
result, this evidence generally supports theview that changes in the
propensity to save or to invest of residentsof an industrial country
were reflected in changes in that country'sinvestment share or saving
share.
To examine whether such relationships existfor developing as well
as developed countries, our analysis firstexamines saving and invest—
ment behavior in these two groups of countriesin two periods: 1960—73
and 1974—84. The first of these time periods representsthe Bretton
Woods era of fixed exchange rates. It might be expectedthat the degree
of integration of markets for real savings andinvestment would be much
higher in the second period, as the largestindustrialized countries
removed their capital controls, the OPEC surpluses wererecycled, and
the EurocurrenCy markets experienced rapid growth.
Table 2 presents OLS regressions relating savingand investment
ratios (for both the levels and changes in theratios) for the groups of
industrial countries, developing countries and allcountries. For the— 13—
Table2. Ordinary Least SquaresRegressions
of the Investment Ratio (I/Y)Against
the National Saving Ratio (NS/Y) 1/
Country Group
(and number of
Adjusted countries) Sample Period Regression Equation R2
Developing Countries
(50 observations)
1960—73 (I/y) =.118**÷.465**(NS/y) .40
(.015) (.079)
1974—84 (I/y) =.126**+ .602**(N5/y) .59
(.014) (.071)




1960—73 (I/y) =.069*+ .746**(Ns/y) .79
(.026) (.104)
1974—84 (I/Y) =.063÷.736**(NS/y) .57
(.039) (.173)














+ .477**(NS/y) + .563DV.(N5/y) .65
(.057) (.377) —
* Significantat 95 percent level. **Significantat 99 percent level.
!/ Standard errors are given inparentheses. Lidenotesthe change in a given variable, and DV is a dumuiy variablewhich has the value of 1 (other- wise zero) when thecountry is an industrial country. See theAppendix for definitions and sources of data.— 14—
regressionsrelating the levels of the savings and investmentratios, all
coefficients are highly significant statistically. Moreover,the coeff i—
cients are higher for the industrialized countriesthan for the developing
countries, although we find that the differencein these coefficients is
not statistically significant when the entire sampleis pooled. This is
the same finding as Summers (1985a): there is no signof the greater
ease that one would expect the more openindustrialized countries to have
in financing saving shortfalls. Nor is there any signof the expected
increase in capital mobility after 1973. Thecoefficient for all coun-
tries rises from 0.47 to 0.60. This failureof the coefficient to decline
over time is the same result found byFeldstein (1983) and Penati and
Dooley (1984, p. 9—10). 1/
These results are also supported by examiningthe relationship between
the changes in the average saving and investmentratios over the periods
1960—73 and 1974—84. As indicatedin Table 1, the slopecoefficient
relating the change in the average investmentto income ratios to the
change in the average savings to incomeratio is positive and significant
(at the 99 percent level) for both industrialand developing countries
although the coefficient for the industrialcountries is considerably
higher.
To cope with the government policy reaction argumentand the other
forms of possible econometric endogeneity ofnational saving, we turn to
1/ And by Obstfeld (1985) and Frankel (1985a)for the case of the
United States.— 15—
instrumentalvariables regression. The twoinstrumental variables used
in Table 3 are the ratio ofmilitary expenditure to GNP and theratio of
dependents to working—age population.
(Two developing countrieswere
dropped because data on theirdependency ratio was unavailable; OLS
regressions in the slightly reduced
sample are reported in the toppart
of Table 2 for comparison.)
The results are striking. Inthe case of the developingcountries,
the coefficients lose allstatistical significance. Indeed forthe
1960—73 period, the sign isnot even positive. This wouldappear to
suggest that the high coefficients
reported by many authors in OLS
regressions are entirely attributableto econometric endogeneityproblems,
rather than to imperfect
capital mobility, and that theseproblems are
easily solved by the use of instrumentalvariables. The case of the
industrialized countries isquite different: the coefficientactually
increases somewhat. These resultsonly heighten the puzzling conflict
between the regressions and thepresumption of higher capital mobility
among the industrialized countries than
among the developing countries.
A somewhat similar resultemerges when changes in the average
savings and investment ratios areemployed. For the developingcoun-
tries, the coefficients associated withthe change in the savingsratio
are approximately the same size andpositive in both the OLS and ins-
trumental variables equations, butthe coefficient is notsignificantly
different from zero in theinstrumental variables case. Howeverfor the— 16—
industrialcountries, the comparable savings coefficientrises quite
sharply in value but again becomes insignificant.
One possible explanation for these differentresults for industrial
and developing countries is that the set of 50 developingcountries is
too diverse to treat as all having the same degreeof capital mobility.
In Tables 4 and 5, we focus on the distinctionbetween a group of 21
market borrowers and 14 countries that depend primarilyon official
financing. (Fifteen countries are notclassified by the Fund as either
sort of borrower.) In the OLS regressions(Table 4) the positive and
significant coefficients for the marketborrowers, the official borrowers,
and the combined set of market and official borrowersthat was evident
in Table 1 are still evident. Moreover,the coefficients are higher
after 1973 than before, and they are also higherfor the market borrowers
than the official borrower.
The use of the instrumental variables technique(Table 5) has a much
less important effect on the size and significanceof the coefficients as
it did when all the developed countries wereincluded together, especially
for the post—1973 period. For the market borrowersin particular, the
point estimate of the coefficient now evenexceeds unity, as it did with
the industrialized countries in Table 2.
To sum up the results, the instrumental variablesestimation does
little to clear up the mysteries of the saving—investmentcorrelations:
why they are so high generally, and why theyare even higher for the
industrialized countries than for the developing countries,for the market
borrowers than for the official borrowers,and after 1973 than before.— 17—
Table3. Regressions of I/Y Against NS/Y:









1960—73 (I/Y) =.120**+.455**(Ns/y) .39
(.015) (.082)
1974—84 (I/Y) =.122**+.610**(Ns/y) .62
(.014) (.069)





















1960—73 (I/Y) =.350+ .909(NS/Y)
(.311) (1.84)— 18—
Table3 (concluded). Regressions of If! AgainstNS/Y:
Developing Versus Industrial Countries!I
Country Group
(and number of Adjusted
countries) Sample Period Regression Equation R2
1974—84 (1/!) =.148+ .465(NSIY)
(.098) (.543)























*Significantat 95 percent level.
**Significantat 99 percent level.
!/ Standard errors are given in parentheses. denotes the change in a
given variable, and DV is a dummyvariable which has the value of 1 (other-
wise zero) when the country is an industrial country.See the Appendix
for definitions and sources of data.— 19—
Table4. Ordinary Least Squares Regressions of I/YAgainst NS/Y:




Sample Period Regression Equation
Market Borrowers
(21 observations)
1960—73 (I/Y) =.131**+.445**(Ns/y) .29
(.030) (.148)
1974—84 (I/Y) =.049+.878**(Ns/y) .73
(.030) (.120)




1960—73 (I/Y) =.128**—.366**(Ns/y) .32
(.027) (.136)
1974—84 (I/Y) =.12O**—.678**(Ns/y) .47
(.025) (.191)

















*Significantat 95 percent level.
**Significantat 99 percent level.
!/ Standard errors are given in parentheses. denotes the change in a
given variable, and DO is a dummy variable which takeson the value of 1
(otherwise zero) when the country is an officialborrower. See the Appendix
for definitions and sources of data.— 20
Table 5. Regressions of II? Against NS/Y:
Market Borrowers Versus Official Borrowers 1/
Country Group
Adjusted (and number of




1960—73 (1/?) =.133**+ .350*(NS/Y) .30
(.029) (.142)
1974—84 (I/Y) =.114**+ .686**(NS/Y) .60
(.021) (.159)





1960—73 (I/Y) =.131**+ .002D0
(.034) (.042)
+ 445*(NS/y) —.O95D0.(NS/Y) .31
(.165) (.206)
1974—84 (I/Y) =.049+ .066*DO
(.027) (.039)
+ .878**(NS/Y) —.192D0.(NS/Y) .74
(.108) (.234)











Table5 (concluded). Regressions of I/Y Against NS/Y:
Market Borrowers Versus Official Borrowers !/
Country Group
(and number of Adjusted
observations) Sample Period Regression Equation
1974—84 (I/Y) =.131**+ .549(NS/Y)
(.034) (.265)

























*Significantat 95 percent level.
**Significantat 99 percent level.
1/ Standard errors are given in parentheses. denotes the change in a
given variable, and DO is a dummy variable which has the value of 1 (other-
wise zero) when the country is an official borrower. See the Appendix for
definitions and sources of data.— 22—
IV.Country Size and the Saving—Investment Correlation
We noted at the outset three conditions, all of which taken together
were sufficient if investment were to be uncorrelated with national
saving: (1) investment depends only on the national rate of return (and
purely random factors); (2) the domestic real rate of return equals the
world real rate of return; and (3) the world real rate of return is
exogenous. It was argued that, even if condition (2) holds, condition
(1) is very unlikely to hold since the gap between the domestic and world
rates of return may be affected by endogenous domestic factors. The
instrumental variable regressions are a way of attempting to deal with
the econometric problems created by such endogeneity.
The failure of condition 3 is another possible econometric problem
that has been pointed out by a number of authors. For a country large
enough to affect world financial market conditions, a fall in national
savings might drive up interest rates and crowd out investment everywhere
in the world. It would be erroneous to conclude from the fact that
domestic investment fell when domestic savings fell that there was low
capital mobility, if the rise in interest rates and fall in investment
were as large abroad as in the domestic country. This argument is of
particular interest here because it might seem to explain our findings in
Section III, that the saving investment coefficients appear to be higher
for industrialized countries (which of course tend to be larger in world
financial markets) than for developing countries.— 23—
Ofthe Feldstein—Horioka critiques, Murphy (1984) focuses most
explicitly on the failure of the world interest rate to be exogenous,
cov(r*, NS/Y)0 in our equation (2). 1/ As a way of addressing the
effect of country size, he divides his sample of 17 OECD countries in
two, and finds that the seven large countries have a higher coefficient
on saving (0.98) than the ten small countries (0.59). He interprets the
results as supporting the claim that the high Feldstein—Horioka coeff i—
cients could be due to country size rather than to imperfect capital
mobility.
The argument is very relevant in the case of time series studies.
Obstfeld (1985), for example, attributes the high correlation coefficient
he gets for a U.S. time series to the size of the United States in world
narkets. As a fix—up, Tobin (1983) proposes including, in the equation
for any given country's investment, the saving rates for all the other
individual countries in the sample; he argues that under the hypothesis
of perfect capital mobility, a country's saving will have no more effect
on its owninvestmentthan on other countries' investment. 2/ This tech-
nique would use up too many degrees of freedom. But a natural solution is
to include the saving rates of the rest of the world aggregated. Frankel
(1985) converts the U.S. saving rate to deviations from the world saving
rate, converts the U.S. investment rate to deviations from the world
1/ Harberger (1980), Tobin (1983), and Obstfeld (1985) also criticized
Feldstein and Horioka on the grounds of the "large country" problem.
2/ Tobin acknowledges that the solution is relevant only for time
series studies, not cross—section, but he seems to believe that the
problem itself is relevant and serious even in cross—section studies.— 24—
investmentrate, and finds that the two variables remain highly corre-
lated. The argument is that if capital were perfectly mobile, and crowd-
ing out of investment were due only to the large size of the United States
in world capital markets, then there should be no effect of saving on the
U.S. investment rate beyond the effect on the rest of the world's invest-
ment rate. The rejection of this hypothesis suggests that the saving—
investment correlation cannot be attributed to the large country effect.
In cross section studies, the endogenous foreign interest rate r*
is not a problem to begin with. The statement, "a country's saving rate
affects r*," is a statement about alternative states of the world, as in
time series. It is not possible that cross—section effects on the saving
rate can be attributed to r*, for the simple reason that all countries
share the same r*. In equation (2), cov(r*, NS/Y) is necessarily zero
when r* is the same for every observation.
If one expressed national rates of saving and investment as devia-
tions from world levels as in the time series regression, it would only
change the constant term in the cross—section regression. To take the
concrete example of the fall in the U.S. national savings rate in the
1980s, the large—country effect alone could in theory explain high real
interest rates and a depressing effect on U.S. investment. But if real
interest rates were equalized, the large—country effect alone could not
explain a combination of low saving and investment rates in the United
States together with simultaneous high saving and investment rates in
Japan.— 25—
Harberger(1983) offers an argument why the Feldstein results are
spurious that relies on the factor of country size, but in a way unrelated
to the endogeneity of the world interest rate. The argument is that
large countries tend to be more diverse than small countries (more like
U.S. states and less like city blocks, in Harberger's words). For this
reason, multiple saving and investment shocks tend to cancel out, and
there is proportionately less of a need for the country in the aggregate
to borrow or lend to the rest of the world. When there is a drought in
a small country, it affects the whole economy; the country has to borrow
from abroad. But when there is a drought in Kansas, there may be a good
harvest in California, or a high—tech boom in Massachusetts, or an oil
discovery in Alaska, so that there is proportionately less need for the
United States to borrow from abroad. The argument is analogous to the
optimum currency area literature of the early 1960s which relied on the
regularity that the larger and more economically diverse a region was,
the less need did it have (proportionately) for trade in labor or goods.
with other regions. 1/
Harberger (1983) specifically addresses the issue of industrialized
versus developing countries:
The point to be borne in mind here is that the evidence of the
Feldstein—Horioka paper was assembled from the OECD countries only.
Casting the net wider would have surely thrown up indications of
much greater divergence between saving and investment rates (p. 334).
Harberger's point is a convincing explanation of why current account!
GNP ratios such as calculated by him, Feldstein and Horioka (1980),
1/ It followed that if two regions joined together, the aggregate unit
would be less open than either taken individually. Mundell (1962) put
the argument in terms of labor mobility and McKinnon (1963) in terms of
openness to trade.— 26—
Feldstein(1983), Sachs (1981, pp. 233—37), and Penati and Dooley (1984),
Caprio and Howard (1984), and Summers (1985), might be closer to zero
for large countries than for small countries. But it does not seem in
itself to explain why the investment—saving regression coefficient would
be higher for large countries than for small countries. If the variance
of the saving rate SlY (or of the investment rate disturbances) is smaller
for large countries because shocks cancel out, but changes in net capital
inflow unit change in the current account are the same, then the
variance of the current account will also be smaller but the regression
coefficient need not be.
Let
(4) I/Y =÷(NS/Y)+
Here,depends on parameters, such as the degree of capital mobility and
the sensitivity of investment to the interest rate, which we will assume
the same for different countries. Then,
(5) CA/Y =NS/Y—I!?=— + (l—3)NS/Y —
andVar (CA/Y) =(l_)2Var (NS/Y) +Var(c)+2(l—)Covar(NS/Y, c).
The last term is zero in large samples, in the event (extremely unlikely
without the use of instrumental variables, as we saw in Section III) that
the error term is well behaved. If Var(S/Y) and Var(s) are smaller
for large countries, then Var(CA/Y) will be smaller as well, as Harberger
claims. Nevertheless, a regression coefficient will be estimated as





whereagain the last term is zero in large samples in the event that the
error term is well behaved. The important point is that we should expect
to be no higher among large countries than among small countries. 1/
Murphy (1984) pursues Harberger's suggestion that one should find
more apparent capital mobility for smaller units than for large. He
regresses the investment rate against the saving rate for a cross section
of 143 U.S. corporations and finds a significant coefficient. He argues
that since the corporate capital market is "by almost all standards, a
well integrated capital market with a high degree of capital mobility,"
(p. 335), the correlation test must not be correct. But there is an
element of circularity to this argument. On the one hand, the proposed
explanation for the spurious Feldstein—Horioka results, an endogenous
market—wide interest rate, is not relevant for the cross—section of cor-
porations. On the other hand, there are perfectly good theoretical and
empirical reasons for thinking that corporations' liabilities are not, in
fact, perfect substitutes for each other in investors' portfolios and that
corporations cannot borrow unlimited amounts at the going interest rate.
We are left doubting the perfect integration of the corporate capital
market more than the reliability of the test.
V. Financial and Real Capital Mobility
In our view the evidence that levels and changes in national savings
and investment ratios move together stands up to the empirical issues
1/ The standard error ofin small samples could be affected one way
or the other.— 28—
raisedin the previous sections. In terms of the three conditions laid
out at the beginning of this paper, it is the failure of the second
condition, r =r*,that remains the most likely explanation for the
position covariance of national savings and investment. One reason
why many observers continue to resist the implications of this evidence
is that it seems so clearly at odds with the apparent integration of
financial capital markets, especially those of developed countries.
If by capital mobility we mean the tendency for investors to equalize
expected rates of return on a subset of liquid, short—term, default—free,
financial assets denominated in different currencies or issued by residents
of different countries, then there can be little doubt that capital is
mobile among the major industrial countries. 1/ This definition of
capital mobility, however, is of limited value. It is analogous to
measuring the degree of integration of international goods markets by
noting that prices (measured in a common currency) are equalized for a
subset of goods. There certainly are a large number of agricultural and
1/ However it should be noted that, even if capital is sufficiently
mobile to equalize internationally expected rates of return on two assets,
the equalization will take place in terms of any common currency or
other numeraire, not in terms of the countries' respective goods. Thus,
real Interest parity, which is the condition relevant for saving and
investment, need not hold unless we have not only uncovered interest
parity, but also purchasing power parity. See Frankel (1985) for an
elaboration of this point.— 29—
mineralcommodities for which this condition holds quite strictly. It
is clear, however, that this condition tells us nothing about thetendency
of prices of goods in general to be equalized across countries.In
fact, this more interesting purchasing power parity measure of "goods
mobility" has failed to hold in recent years. The key to thismore
general condition is that within countries the relative prices of goods
change by substantial amounts and with no apparent tendency to return to
their original levels.
An analogous argument can be made in the context of international
markets for securities. The fact that a subset of financial instruments
issued by residents of different countries appear to be perfect substi-
tutes does not mean that the financial markets are fully integrated. As
is also true for goods markets, a useful measure of "capital mobility"
would require that "traded" and "nontraded" financial assets beperfect
substitutes in residents' portfolios so that the relative yields on
these assets within countries are largely independent of international
influences.
The existence of "nontraded" securities is, of course, not obvious.
It can be argued, however, that the possibility of expost taxation of
some types of international positions acts as a barrier to trade in such
assets. Moreover, it is possible that the net indebtedness of acountry
is an important determinant in its incentive to impose such taxes.
The idea that net claims on a given country might be importantto
wealth holders is difficult to model. There is noaggregate asset called
"net claims" that we can identify nor can we directlymeasure the yield— 30—
necessaryin order to induce wealth holders to hold this net position.
In most cases net claims on a given country are a small difference
between two large numbers, gross claims and gross liabilities. Thus
while it may be clear that a risk exists when a country's net debt to
the rest of the world grows it is not clear who holds that risk, that
is, how a loss would be allocated among holders of various financial
claims on the country.
The government, for example, may perceive different costs in
damaging the reputation of various forms of investments. Its own securi-
ties might be an example of an asset unlikely to be taxed, particularly
if these are held by foreign governments. Equity claims, however, might
be relatively easy to identify as owned by nonresidents and, because
they impart control of domestic firms, constitute a relatively attractive
tax base for political reasons.
If assets such as Treasury securities and equity claims are
imperfect substitutes within countries the structure of yields between
countries and within countries will reflect a complex set of expectations
concerning the likely incidence of an ex post tax on nonresident claims
as well as "arbitrage" conditions that will determine how and by whom
such risks are borne.
It follows that arbitrage among a select set of internationally
traded "safe" financial assets need not imply that yields on more
vulnerable nontraded assets are also equalized. What is necessary is
that differentials that might arise within a country are not closely
arbitraged. That is, the yields on Treasury securities and other— 31—
tradablesecurities would have to diverge from yields on equities and
other nontradable assets. The analogy in goods markets would be that
prices of traded goods are equalized across countries but the relative
prices of traded and nontraded goods within countries will change in
response to economic conditions.
This framework might be made more clear by illustrating the financial
and real linkages between and within two very simple economies. Financial
assets consist of claims on physical capital, E, interest—bearing claims
on the government, B, and fiat money, M. The yield on equity claims is
the marginal revenue product of the capital stock,r. Interest—bearing
government bonds yield a nominal rate of rp and fiat money, which
is also a liability of the governments, yields no nominal return.
(1) Md =Md(,•g)
(2) Bd =Bd(,g)
d d — (3)E =E(r rg)
In describing the linkages between the two countries' financial
systems it is assumed that government bonds are traded securities while
equity claims are nontraded securities. As with goods and services the
terms traded and nontraded securities are an analytical convenience that
represents a continuum of assets. For simplicity it is assumed that
government—issued securities are perfect substitutes across countries so
that
(4) rg=r+E()— 32—
However,since equity claims are not traded, the linkages between rp and
rp* are only indirect. The two monies aretradable but are assumed to be
dominated by government securities in the portfolios of nonresidents. !/
Thesefinancial market assumptions are illustrated as follows:
Money ÷(NoTrade)+ Money
.t.




(Imperfect Substitutes) (Imperfect Substitutes)
4-
Physical Capital (No Trade) *PhysicalCapital
Note that the arbitrage between the two capital stocks is limited
both across, due to country risk, and up and down, due in our assumptions
concerning substitution parameters between equities and government bonds.
The linkages between the financial sector and real sector within
each country are as follows. Real investment is defined as transforming
current output into a capital good which has an "own" rate of return in
terms of future output. Investment will be positive when the present
value of the expected future output exceeds the cost of the capital.
As discussed above, the discount rate, need not be equal to the
government security rate since domestic savers might require a variable
differential in order to hold willingly existing government debt and
claims on the capital stock.
1/ In terms of the literature we are thus assuming "perfect capital
mobility" but no currency substitution. Note however, that the addi-
tion of nontraded securities to the model will alter the "standard"
interpretation of "capital mobility" as defined by (4).— 33—
(5)I =I(r)
Savings in each country is a function of two independent rates of
return, the two government bond yields (which are assumed equal because
of arbitrage across countries) and the yield on the domestic capital
stock.
(6) S =S(r,rg)
The real sector linkages between countries are derived from the
above conditions and the balance of payments constraint. That is, a
net excess demand for the traded security must be identically equal
to the differences between output and absorption (or public plus private
savings and investment) in each country. The mechanism that insures this
equality is left in the background. It may or may not involve income,
prices and real exchange rate changes, which are assumed unchanged in
this discussion.
The essential features of this framework are illustrated below
(Figure 1). Because these relations are drawn with respect to returns on
traded securities, the yield on nontraded securities,rp, is a parameter
in the savings and investment functions. Since government bonds are
perfect substitutes across countries, rg and rg* are always equal. In
the initial position, domestic savings for both countries are set equal to
domestic investment plus the domestic fiscal deficit at r by assumption.
It is evident that shifts in the 1, 1* or S, S functions, or a
change in either countries' fiscal deficit, will result in some net trade
of government bonds and a current account imbalance in this framework.1*, S*, G*
Rest of World
But there is no presumption that this trade in tlsafe!I securities will be
sufficient to equalize r and r. In general the disturbance in this
model will be dissipated by both a change in the structure of yields,
savings and investment behavior within countries, and net trades of goods
and securities between countries. The relative importance of these
equilibrating mechanisms depends on the degree of segmentation of finan-
cial markets, the response of savings and investment to the two financial
yields, and the nature of the shock to the system.
Suppose in this system the domestic fiscal deficit increases (due to
a bond financed increase in government expenditures), shifting the I +G
curve to the right to I +G'(Figure 1). In autarky rg would be bid
up, and if rp was bid up only slightly, so that shifts in I and S were
negligible, r would rise to r. If we now open the economy, and



















equilibriumwill be at r =r2.
At this point the traded security
yields will have risen sufficiently to increase S + S so that the
domestic fiscal deficit is covered. This will generate a current account
deficit in the home country, a b, equal to the difference between domestic
savings and I + G', and a current account surplus, c d, in the foreign
country. There is an equivalent net trade of government securities.
If we assume that the financial markets are highly integrated within
each country, a rise in rg =rg*will tend also to raise r and r. In
this case the S and S curves in Figure 1 would shift to the right and the
I + G' and 1* + curves would shift to the left as private investment
is crowded out. If the two countries were identical, the rise in rg =rg*
would be less but we would observe the same current account deficit
following a fiscal deficit as described above.
A shift in the investment schedule or the saving schedule would
differ in at least one important respect from the fiscal deficit shock
discussed above. Assume that the private investment function shifts to
the right by the same amount as the fiscal deficit discussed above so
that I ÷ G shifts to I' + G (Figure 2). The effects of such a shift
appear to be similar as described above in that r =r0
would rise
until the level of savings in both countries covered the increase in
1 *1







However, in this case the shift in the domestic investment function would
tend to raise rp directly and this would shift II +Gto I" +C.More-
over, the rise in rp would cause S S in Figure 2 to shift tothe right
to S' S'. For these reasons an ex ante shift in the domestic investment
schedule would have a smaller effect on the traded securities market
shown as shown by the dashed curves in Figure 2. The initial disequi-
librium in the domestic traded securities market would be mitigated by a
rise in rp. It follows that the size of the shock transmitted to the
other country is smaller as compared to a fiscal deficit if the domestic
financial market is poorly integrated. For this reason the current
account imbalance would also be smaller.
In general, it apears that a more complete description of the
linkages among financial markets within and between countries might
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investment.The very simple model proposed above suggests that these
correlations should break down in cases where the dominant shocks to the
system are unusually large fiscal deficits that are uncorrelated across
countries. In the absence of such conditions, differences or changes in
domestic savings and investment functions might have limited impact on
current account imbalances.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The evidence brought together in this paper suggests to the authors
that a close association between national savings and national investment
is a robust empirical regularity. This finding casts considerable doubt
on the widely held view that national markets for physical capital are
highly integrated. The positive correlations between levels and changes
in national saving rates and investment rates, which are apparent both
for industrial countries and developing countries and which are higher
in recent years as compared to earlier time periods, stand up to a
variety of econometric objections. The only data set for which the
empirical regularity is not apparent includes developing countries that
depend primarily on aid to finance current account imbalances.
The fact that national markets for some types of financial capital
are integrated may be irrelevant in evaluating the degree of integration
of national markets for physical capital. The tendency for expected
returns on liquid, default free financial assets to be equalized does not
imply that expected returns on physical capital are also equalized.— 38—
Wedo not know why the apparent isolation of national markets for
physical capital has persisted in the face of substantial expansion of
trade in goods and services and financial capital. Further research into
these matters might focus on the impediments to net transfers of real
savings to "foreign" political jurisdictions. A better understanding of
such factors might suggest policy measures that would encourage more
productive use of world savings.— 39— APPENDIX
Data Sources
GDP at market prices, (Y)gross domestic investment, (I) and gross
domestic savings (NS) are conventional nationalincome concepts drawn from
World Bank EPDNA data files. Theage dependency ratio is the ratio of
dependent population (under 16 and over 64) toworking age population
(15 to 64) drawn from the same source.Military expenditures are from
data files of the U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency. The defini—
tions for official borrowers, market borrowers andcombined borrowers as
well as lists of countries in eachcategory can be found on pages 173—174
of the International Monetary Fund's 1986 WorldEconomic Outlook.— 40—
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